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The question that motivated this study was to investigate the relation between trait anxiety,
emotions and memory control. To this aim, memory suppression was explored in high and
low trait anxiety individuals with the Think/No-think paradigm. After learning associations
between neutral words and emotional scenes (negative, positive, and neutral), participants
were shown a word and were requested either to think about the associated scene or to
block it out frommind. Finally, in a test phase, participantswere again shown eachword and
asked to recall the paired scene.The results show thatmemory control is inﬂuenced by high
trait anxiety and emotions. Low trait anxiety individuals showed a memory suppression
effect, whereas there was a lack of memory suppression in high trait anxious individuals,
especially for emotionally negative scenes. Thus, we suggest that individuals with anxiety
may have difﬁculty exerting cognitive control over memories with a negative valence.
These ﬁndings provide evidence that memory suppression can be impaired by anxiety
thus highlighting the crucial relation between cognitive control, emotions, and individual
differences in regulating emotions.
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INTRODUCTION
It is probably wishful thinking that some experiences in life are
best forgotten in order to protect our mental well-being. Thus, a
fundamental question is whether it is really possible to intention-
ally suppress unwanted memories. This question is fascinating
because the ability to exert cognitive control over memory has
important implications for cognitive functioning and mental dis-
orders (Banich et al., 2009; Depue, 2012). A still unresolved issue
is whether we can inhibit the retrieval of speciﬁc emotional mem-
ories and control them. Cognitive control might be particularly
important when we are confronted with memories that we wish to
avoid thinking about, such as those that are emotionally negative.
If these memories are not controlled, they might become intrusive
in our consciousness (Erskine et al., 2007). This is especially the
case of negative memories that have the capacity to unsettle our
mental life by continuously intruding into cognitive operations.
In some conditions, such as post-traumatic stress (PTSD) or anx-
iety disorders, the retrieval of these memories may cause serious
distress and mental impairment (McNally, 2006; Schönfeld et al.,
2007; Banich et al., 2009; Depue, 2012). Furthermore, persistent
intrusive thoughts are a key source of distress across many forms
of psychopathology (Magee et al., 2012).
The issue pursued in this study is part of this more general
research topic on the complex interaction between cognitive con-
trol, memory, and emotions (for a review see Pessoa, 2008; Banich
et al., 2009) with particular focus on individual differences in trait
anxiety.
The core mechanisms underlying memory suppression are
executive control processes that are engaged to control and
inhibit the inﬂuence of unwanted memories by rendering retrieval
more difﬁcult (Anderson and Green, 2001; Levy and Ander-
son, 2008). The existence of this attempt to control memory
has been demonstrated behaviorally and more recently also by
means of neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies (for a
review see Depue, 2011, 2012). These studies suggest that mem-
ory suppression occurs through cognitive inhibitory control as
demonstrated by an increased activation of the prefrontal cortex
which down-regulates the hippocampal regions. The prefrontal
cortex is involved in sending an inhibitory signal to the target
memory, stored in long-term memory, by disengaging episodic
retrieval (Anderson et al., 2004; Depue et al., 2007; Benoit and
Anderson, 2012; Depue, 2012).
A further aspect to consider in this complex interplay between
cognitive control and memory is the role of emotions (Phelps,
2004; Pessoa, 2008, 2012; de Gelder and VandenBulcke, 2012;
Van den Stock and de Gelder, 2012). Cognition and emotions are
jointly associated and this is shownby the inﬂuence of emotions on
perceptual processing, attention, executive functions, andmemory
(Pessoa, 2009; Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010; Pessoa et al., 2012).
In this regard, memories for emotional events appear more vivid
and are often better encoded and remembered than neutral events
(Kensinger and Corkin, 2003). On one hand, suppressing memo-
rieswith an emotional contentmight be harder due to the evidence
that they are normally better represented and retrieved than are
neutral experiences (LaBar and Cabeza, 2006) as is well known
for intrusive memories in PTSD or anxiety (McNally, 2006). On
the other, however, one should consider that emotional memories
might be particularly suitable to motivate our cognitive control
strategies to either promote remembering or hinder it (Pessoa,
2009; Levy and Anderson, 2012; van Schie et al., 2013). The ﬁnd-
ings on memory control over emotions are quite mixed: some
studies found an enhanced suppression for negative emotions
(Joormann et al., 2005; Depue et al., 2006; Lambert et al., 2010)
suggesting that it is easier to forget negative memories while other
studies reported smaller or no suppression effects for negative
emotions (Marx et al., 2008; Murray et al., 2011).
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The above studies have shown that it is possible to establish
a relation between executive control of memory and emotions;
however, a third relevant point to consider is why sometimes this
control ismissing or difﬁcult to exert. In this vein, Levy andAnder-
son (2008) suggested that the absence of suppression might be due
to individual differences in executive control. A particular condi-
tion inwhich executive control functions arenot efﬁcient as a result
of negative emotions is anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007; Banich et al.,
2009). Speciﬁcally, individuals with anxiety may have difﬁculty
exerting cognitive control over emotional information (Engels
et al., 2007). It is well known that anxiety is characterized by a
poorer executive control which might impair functions such as
inhibition and attentional control (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Eysenck
et al., 2007; Derakshan et al., 2009; Righi et al., 2009; Ansari and
Derakshan, 2011; Choi et al., 2012). There is compelling evidence
that anxious individuals show increased attentional capture by
cues signaling danger and are more likely to interpret emotionally
ambiguous stimuli as threatening (Bishop, 2007).
Neurocognitive theories of anxiety have suggested that the
amygdala activity is increased in anxiety in response to poten-
tial threat (Mathews et al., 1997). This hyperactivity could in turn
strongly bias bottom–up attention allocation for threat (Bishop
et al., 2004). Studies investigating the role of frontal cortical
regions in the top–down control of emotion have shown that anx-
ious individualsmay have not only increased amygdala activity but
also decreased recruitment of frontal control areas (Bishop et al.,
2004; Bishop, 2009; Ferneyhough et al., 2013). It has been widely
demonstrated that in high anxiety individuals threat-related pro-
cessing is enhanced and the attempts at thought suppression
generate an enhanced memory bias for threat material (Coles and
Heimberg, 2002; Kircanski et al., 2008).
In the light of this evidence the aim that motivated this
study was to explore the relation between memory suppres-
sion and emotions in high and low trait anxiety individuals. To
do that we employed a speciﬁc paradigm that has enabled to
demonstrate the ability to strategically forget information: the
“Think/No-think” paradigm, developed by Anderson and Green
(2001). This paradigm requires participants to associate pairs
of stimuli, learn these pairs to a high degree thus establish-
ing episodic long-term memory representations and gain control
over the encoded memories by either recalling or inhibiting
recall. In the present study this procedure was used with neu-
tral words associated to emotional negative, positive, and neutral
scenes. Success in this task likely relies on some active pro-
cess that enables to stop the to-be-forgotten item from reaching
consciousness (Anderson et al., 2004). Therefore, a crucial char-
acteristic of this task relies on the ability to inhibit a learned
item.
This paradigm has been previously widely used to uncover the
neural underpinnings of memory suppression (e.g., Anderson and
Green, 2001; Anderson et al., 2004; Joormann et al., 2005; Depue
et al., 2006, 2007; Paz-Alonso et al., 2009, 2013; Anderson et al.,
2011; Murray et al., 2011; Waldhauser et al., 2012; Depue et al.,
2013; van Schie et al., 2013), although some studies failed to ﬁnd
a reliable suppression effect (see Bulevich et al., 2006).
Some relevant previous studies that employed the Think/No-
think are noteworthy to mention. The study by Depue et al. (2006)
showed that for both verbal and non-verbal material inhibitory
inﬂuences of cognitive control were larger for negative than neu-
tral items. Similar results were also found by van Schie et al. (2013),
who suggested that direct suppression might impair negative stim-
uli. Furthermore, there is evidence that both emotional and
neutral information can be successfully suppressed from mem-
ory (Murray et al., 2011). In similar vein, memory suppression
was observed following the “no think” phase for memories associ-
ated with emotionally negative material (Lambert et al., 2010). In
contrast to these studies, strongest inhibition effects were found
also for highly arousing pleasant words (Marx et al., 2008).
However, only two studies have so far investigated this ques-
tion considering anxiety, one by using neutral words (Waldhauser
et al., 2010), and the other by using neutral and negative pictures
(Dieler et al., 2013). The former found that better suppression
was predicted by lower trait anxiety; the latter showed that higher
ruminative tendencies and trait anxiety interfered with successful
thought suppression, underlining the importance of considering
personality characteristics in memory suppression tasks.
On the basis of this evidence, the present study was speciﬁ-
cally focused on the interaction between emotion and cognitive
control. Our hypothesis was to ﬁnd differences in high compared
to low anxious individuals in the retrieval of suppressed nega-
tive compared to neutral and positive memories. Since anxiety
is characterized by a decreased executive control and by a bias
for emotional events one would expect to ﬁnd an enhanced difﬁ-
culty in anxious individuals to control and suppress “unwanted”
emotionally negative memories.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty right-handed participants (16 females; age 20–30) were
selected from a sample of 150 university students based on their
scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). Participants
werematched for age, years of education,were native Italian speak-
ers, hadnormal or corrected-to-normal vision andnoneurological
or psychiatric disorders. All participants gave informed consent
and received class credit for taking part in the experiment that was
carried out in accordance with the guidelines of the Declaration
of Helsinki.
We subdivided our sample in two groups (n = 15 for each
group) with high and low scores at the STAI (Spielberger et al.,
1970), respectively. The STAI consists of 40 items measuring anx-
iety along the two distinct dimensions of state and trait. We used
the Italian version of the STAI (Sanavio et al., 1997) that was also
used previously by Righi et al. (2009); only scores obtained in the
trait anxiety questionnairewere considered. Participantswere clas-
siﬁed as low-trait anxious or high-trait anxious if they scored one
standard deviation below or above mean values, respectively (the
normative scores considered were: for males up to 25 years old:
Mean: 40.6, SD: 8.3; for males above 25 years: 37.8, 8.7; for females
up to 25 years: 43.1, 9.3; for females 25 years: 42.2, 11).
STIMULI
Stimuli consisted of 99 neutral words and emotional scenes (neg-
ative, positive, and neutral). The scenes were selected, on the
basis of the normative ratings, from the International Affective
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Picture Series (IAPS; Lang et al., 1995) and matched for size and
luminance. All words used were controlled for length, grammat-
ical class, frequency of use, emotional valence, concreteness, and
meaningfulness on the basis of a standardized database (Barca
et al., 2002).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The experimental session consisted of three blocks (33 trials for
each block), each including a complete Think/No-think procedure
characterized by: (1) training-learning phase, (2) Think/No-think
phase, and (3) test-retrieval phase; the procedure is shown in
Figure 1. A similar blocked design of the Think/No-think task
was used in previous studies (Depue et al., 2006; Hanslmayr et al.,
2009). The procedure was divided into the following phases:
(1) In the training-learning phase of each block, participants
learned to remember 33 word-scene pairs (all the words were
neutral in emotional valence while the scenes could either be
positive, negative, or neutral), whichwere displayed on a screen for
4,000 ms. Participants were ﬁrst instructed to learn all word-scene
pairs, and then their memory was tested by showing only the word
(cue) and asking to recall the related scene by verbally describing
it. If they pressed the “I recall” button they were requested to ver-
bally describe the scene by producing ﬁve words that described
each picture. These descriptions were then scored as correct when
all ﬁve words were congruent to the right scene or incorrect. This
learning procedure was repeated until participants could recall the
correct scene, previously paired with a word, with 70% accuracy
over all pairs (an average of two repetitions).
(2) In the Think/No-Think phase, participants saw 18 words
(for each block), half of these being assigned to the think condi-
tion and half to the no-think condition. In both conditions, a trial
consisted of a ﬁxation cross followed by theword-cue for 3,500ms,
FIGURE 1 | Representation of the Think/No-Think procedure,
divided in three phases: (A) training-learning in which
participants studied pairs of neutral words and unrelated
emotional scenes, and were then tested to ensure learning to
criterion; (B) only word were presented within a green (Think
condition) or red (No-Think condition) frame and pre-cued by
a green or red fixation (∗); participants during “think” trials
were instructed to try and recall the associated scene,
whereas for “No-think” trials they were instructed to put the
paired associate out of mind entirely. 45 pairs of stimuli were
not presented during the Think/No-think phase because they
served as baseline; (C) participants were asked to recall the
scene associated with the presented word-cue. (Images of scenes
were taken from IAPS, Lang et al., 1995).
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and then by a 600 ms intertrial interval. The ﬁxation cross turned,
after a variable delay, from 1,000 to 1,500 ms duration, and was
either red or green informing participants whether to prepare for
thinking of a previously studied item (think: green) or to prepare
to block it out (no-think: red). This was used to allow partici-
pants to prepare for the upcoming memory cue (Hanslmayr et al.,
2009; Hanslmayr et al., 2010). As inAnderson andGreen (2001), in
the think condition, participants were instructed to: “Think of the
scene previously associatedwith theword”whereas in the no-think
condition, they were instructed to “Try not to let the previously
associated scene come into consciousness.” Importantly, partic-
ipants received direct suppression instructions by asking them
to focus on the cue and suppress retrieval of target by blocking
thoughts about it, without replacing it with other thoughts (see
also van Schie et al., 2013). Within each condition (think, no-
think), participants viewed all the words ﬁve times. The words not
shown in this experimental phase (15 for each block with a total
of 45 neutral words and 15 negative, 15 positive, and 15 neutral
scenes) served as baseline (items never repeated).
(3) During the ﬁnal test phase (for each block), partic-
ipants were shown all the words they had seen previously
(coming from think, No-think, and baseline conditions) and
were requested to press one of two buttons if they could
recall the associated scene. If they pressed the “I recall” button
they were requested to verbally describe the scene by pro-
ducing ﬁve words that described each picture. These descrip-
tions were then scored as correct or incorrect. A correct
response was scored when all ﬁve words were correct for each
presented scene (these responses were matched with a pre-
determined list of words that were relevant and congruent for
each image).
The order of cue presentation was randomized so that the test
order differed from the learning or experimental phases. Also the
presented scenes and the presentation of the three blocks were
randomized. A training session was carried out before the exper-
iment started in order to get the participants familiar with the
memory suppression task. All the participants reported, at the end
of the experimental procedure, that they complied with the task
instructions.
RESULTS
TRAINING-LEARNING PHASE
A repeated measure ANOVA factoring memory for blocks (ﬁrst,
second, and third), Emotion (neutral, negative, and positive),
and Trait Anxiety (low and high) as between-factor was carried
out on the accuracy of the training-learning phase. This speciﬁc
analysis was performed to evaluate the effect of the sequence of
blocks on memory performance in particular concerning the pres-
ence of differences between the two anxiety groups. The results
showed that no main effect or interaction reached signiﬁcance
(ps > 0.05). Furthermore, no signiﬁcant differences emerged for
the between Trait Anxiety factor (p = 0.43). The mean accuracy
for each condition was: for the Low Trait Anxiety group: posi-
tive scenes: M = 89.90, SD = 13; negative scenes: M = 84.85,
SD = 13; neutral scenes: M = 87.27, SD = 10; for the High Trait
Anxiety group: positive scenes: M = 86.26, SD = 13.7; nega-
tive scenes: M = 86.87, SD = 13.3; neutral scenes: M = 87.56,
SD = 13.2.
These analyses show that the groups do not differ for mem-
ory encoding capacity which in principle might have affected the
observed results concerning memory suppression, see below. By
the same token the results also show that there is no effect on
memory performance as a function of the block sequence.
RETRIEVAL
A mixed repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on accuracy,
percentage of correctly recalled scenes, during the test phase. Trait
Anxiety (low and high) was the between-factor, Memory (think,
no-think, and baseline), and Emotion (neutral, negative, and pos-
itive) were the within-subject factors. Accuracy scores for the ﬁnal
recall are plotted in Figures 2 and 3A shows baseline corrected
accuracy for the No-Think condition (the baseline was subtracted
from the No-Think condition). Bonferroni correction was applied
for multiple comparisons. Additional ANOVAs were carried out
FIGURE 2 | Overall mean correct recall percentages of emotional scenes (positive, negative, and neutral) for baseline, think and no-think conditions,
shown on the left for the high trait anxiety group and on the right for the low trait anxiety group.
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Mean recall percentages, for the no-think condition, of emotional scenes (positive, negative, and neutral) as a function of low or high trait
anxiety. (B) Mean reaction times for correctly recalled negative, positive or neutral scenes in the no-think condition, as a function of low or high trait anxiety.
for post hoc comparisons. No participant required more than three
cycles of learning phase to achieve the learning criterion of 70%.
To exclude possible effects caused by the blocks order (ﬁrst,
second, or third presented block) a preliminary ANOVA was per-
formed including as factor the Block order. No signiﬁcant main
effect or interaction emerged for this factor, (ps > 0.05).
The analysis yielded a signiﬁcant effect of Memory
F(2,56) = 31.3, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.53 showing higher percentage
of recall after the think compared to both baseline and no-think
conditions (both ps = 0.001). Importantly, the memory sup-
pression effect was demonstrated by the poorer accuracy for the
no-think condition compared to baseline items, p = 0.001. This
result replicates previous reports showing that direct suppres-
sion can impair recall of “unwanted” memories. However, most
importantly for the purpose of the present study, this memory
effects were modulated by individual differences in anxiety and
emotions. This was reﬂected by the signiﬁcant interactions Mem-
ory x Trait Anxiety, F(2,56) = 8.02, p = 0.006, η2p = 0.22, and
Memory × Emotion × Trait Anxiety F(4,112) = 3.4, p = 0.02,
η2p = 0.10.
Post hoc comparisons showed in the low trait anxiety group a
poorer performance in recalling the scene for the no-think com-
pared to the think, p < 0.001, and baseline conditions, p < 0.002;
in addition think items were better retrieved than baseline items,
p< 0.001. Low anxietywas related to amarginally signiﬁcant effect
of emotion, with poorer performance (that means, i.e., enhanced
suppression) for negative compared to neutral scenes, p = 0.05.
Overall, these results replicate the memory suppression effect in
low anxiety individuals with a trend to better suppress negative
scenes.
More importantly, the results showed that the memory
suppression effect, with poorer recall in the no-think condi-
tion, was absent in high trait anxiety individuals who, in con-
trast, showed a higher accuracy for the no-think negative scenes
compared to the low trait anxiety group, F(1,28)= 29.2, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.51. Notably, this difference was related to the emotional
value of the scenes. Speciﬁcally, emotionally negative scenes were
less suppressed in high compared to low trait anxiety participants.
Another difference was found by comparing the two groups: a
higher percentage of recall for negative scenes in the baseline con-
dition emerged for high compared to low trait anxious individuals,
F(1,28) = 4.6, p = 0.04,η2p = 0.14. In addition, in the high anxious
group no signiﬁcant differences emerged for the different memory
conditions indicating an absence of memory suppression.
A further variable that has been considered was response laten-
cies in recall (Reaction times: RT) for the emotional scenes. RTs for
correctly recalled items were also submitted to repeated measures
ANOVA (with the same factors as for accuracy), see Figure 3B;
errors of omission (missing key press), and trials with RTs faster
than 200 ms were excluded from the analyses.
The analysis showed two signiﬁcant interactions: Memory x
Trait Anxiety, F(2, 56) = 5.9, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.17, and Mem-
ory × Emotion × Trait Anxiety, F(4,112) = 2.8, p = 0.043,
η2p = 0.09. The differences in RTs between the two groups were
found for theNo-Think condition. Paralleling the accuracy results,
the high trait anxiety group was signiﬁcantly faster, compared to
the low trait anxiety group, in recalling negative scenes after the
no-think instructions, p = 0.02. This shows that, for those items
that were recalled correctly, time of response was inﬂuenced by the
level of anxiety; high levels of trait anxiety hampered the memory
suppression effect. No signiﬁcant differences emerged for the high
trait anxiety group while for the low trait anxiety group longer RTs
were found for no-think compared to think items, p = 0.02.
EVALUATION OF EMOTIONAL SCENES
To assess the participants’ subjective emotional response to valence
and arousal, at the end of the Think/No-think paradigm all scenes
were evaluatedﬁrst for valence and second for arousal. Participants
were instructed to recognize the presented scenes as negative,
positive, or neutral and then to rate them on a 5-point scale,
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ranging from “not at all” to “very much,” ﬁrst for valence and
then for arousal. These ratings were analyzed with repeated mea-
suresANOVAswithTraitAnxiety (low andhigh) as between-factor
and Emotion (negative, neutral, and positive) as within factor; the
results are reported in Figure 4.
VALENCE
In this rating negative, positive, and neutral scenes were presented
and participants were asked to rate how much emotional they
found the scene (different questions were presented for each emo-
tion; for negative scenes: “how much, from 0 to 5 points, is this
scene negative for you?”; for positive scenes: “how much, from 0 to
5 points, is this scene positive for you?”; for neutral scenes: “how
much, from 0 to 5 points, is this scene neutral for you?”).
Emotion and Trait Anxiety were signiﬁcant, [F(2,56) = 65.1,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.69; F(1,28) = 9.01, p = 0.006, η2p = 0.24].
These effects were further qualiﬁed by the signiﬁcant interaction
Emotion by Trait Anxiety, F(2,56) = 27.7, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.51.
Post hoc comparisons showed that negative scenes were judged
as more negative by high compared to low trait anxiety individ-
uals, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.7. Furthermore, in the high trait anxiety
grouppositive scenes obtained lower ratings compared to negative,
p < 0.001, and neutral scenes, p = 0.001; in the low trait anxiety
group neutral scenes were rated with higher scores compared to
positive and negative scenes, ps < 0.001.
AROUSAL
The ANOVA showed a signiﬁcant effect of Emotion and of Trait
Anxiety, [F(2,56) = 186.7, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.87; F(1,28) = 15.4,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.35]. These effects were further character-
ized by the signiﬁcant interaction Emotion by Trait Anxiety,
F(2,56) = 40.4, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.59, showing that negative scenes
were evaluated as more arousing by the high compared to the
low trait anxiety group, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.64. Furthermore in
the anxious group negative scenes were considered more arous-
ing than neutral and positive scenes, ps < 0.001 while a different
response pattern emerged in the low trait anxiety group with pos-
itive scenes evaluated as more arousing compared to neutral and
negative scenes, ps < 0.001.
These results conﬁrmed that there was a threat bias speciﬁc for
negative scenes in individuals with high trait anxiety.
DISCUSSION
The present study examined whether memories for emotional
scenes could be forgotten, by considering individual differences
in trait anxiety in the Think/No-think paradigm.
We conﬁrmed previous work by showing that the suppres-
sion of previously encoded target scenes can cause later forgetting
of unwanted memories (Anderson and Green, 2001; Anderson
et al., 2004; Depue et al., 2006, 2007; Levy and Anderson, 2008)
but that this suppression effect is highly inﬂuenced by trait anx-
iety. Importantly, the present ﬁndings suggest that higher levels
of trait anxiety interfere with and disrupt memory control by
causing a lack of intentional suppression of memories. These
results are in keeping with a recent study showing that high levels
of trait anxiety predict the ineffectiveness of memory suppres-
sion for neutral words (Waldhauser et al., 2010). Furthermore,
the importance of considering individual differences in the abil-
ity to suppress thoughts was very recently shown by Dieler et al.
(2013), who, by employing psychometric measures, demonstrated
the inﬂuence of certain depressive and anxious traits on thought
suppression.
Importantly, here we show that this difﬁculty of high anxiety
individuals in controlling memory emerged especially in the recall
of emotionally negative rather than positive or neutral scenes.
These ﬁndings highlight the strength and importance of the rela-
tion between executive control and emotions. The low trait anxiety
group showed the classical memory suppression effect expected in
the Think/No-think task with a better recall for “think” scenes
and a poorer recall for “no-think” items compared to both the
think and the baseline conditions demonstrating that the con-
trol over memory occurred successfully (Anderson and Green,
FIGURE 4 | Emotional rating of the presented scenes (on a 5-point scale: from not at all to very much). Left panel: evaluation of arousal (how much was
the scene considered arousing) for both groups; right panel: evaluation of valence: how much the presented scene was negative, positive, or neutral for low
and high trait anxiety individuals (*p < 0.01).
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2001; Levy and Anderson, 2002). Moreover, the suppression effect
on accuracy was also paralleled by the longer-latency responses
for items recollected after the no-think condition. The difference
found between no-think and baseline items, with a poorer recall
for the former, known as the “negative control effect,” shows that
retrieval suppression causes more forgetting than would normally
occur after a period of time; this was reported in several previous
studies using words (Anderson and Green, 2001; Anderson et al.,
2004; Paz-Alonso et al., 2009; van Schie et al., 2013), faces, and
scenes (Depue et al., 2006, 2007).
Interestingly, in the present study this pattern of results was
not found in high trait anxiety individuals that showed no differ-
ences between think, no-think, and baseline conditions and had a
better recall with respect to non-anxious individuals, for no-think
negative scenes. Negative scenes coming from the no-think proce-
dure showed enhanced accuracy and shorter reaction times in the
high compared to the low trait anxiety group. One should note
that these results are unlikely to be related to the use of differ-
ent strategies causing possible interferences during the no-think
phase because participants were strongly discouraged from gen-
erating other memory associations while viewing the word-cues
(Bäuml and Hanslmayr, 2010; van Schie et al., 2013).
Based on these results we suggest that it is possible to con-
trol various aspects of memory by engaging cognitive mech-
anisms of control and inhibition but that these operations
become dysfunctional with increasing levels of anxiety (Eysenck
et al., 2007). Thus, in this case, anxious traits might repre-
sent a marker of inefﬁcient cognitive control functions (Dieler
et al., 2013). In keeping with that, behavioral results indicated
that individuals with Attention Deﬁcit Hyperactivity Disorder
showed no reductions in recall during no-think trials sug-
gesting an inhibitory deﬁcit (Depue et al., 2010); moreover,
encoding and retrieval inhibition in directed forgetting were
impaired in individuals with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD;
Konishi et al., 2011), and also depressed participants have been
reported to be impaired in suppression performance (Hertel
and Gerstle, 2003; Joormann et al., 2005; Hertel and Mahan,
2008).
Moreover, the absence of intentional suppression was more
evident in anxiety when participants were confronted with mem-
ories that had a negative value (see also Dieler et al., 2013). In line
with this result, the PFC was found to be less activated during
the processing of threat-related stimuli in participants with high
STAI compared to those with low scores (Bishop et al., 2004). In
relation to the role of emotions in memory suppression, Depue
et al. (2006) showed a greater no-think effect for negative than for
neutral valence, suggesting that negative items may be easier to
suppress. Moreover, suppression was observed for negative, but
not for positive, emotional content by Lambert et al. (2010). Neg-
ative valences images have been shown to elicit greater cognitive
control than neutral stimuli (Depue et al., 2006; Butler and James,
2010).
In line with these results, in the present study low trait anxi-
ety individuals showed a tendency to be facilitated in the memory
suppression of negative scenes. However, not all studies showed
suppression for negative events, for example, using the Think/No-
think task, highly arousing negative words were found to be
resistant to memory suppression (Marx et al., 2008); and in a suc-
cessful directed forgetting task memory control was found for
neutral but not negative pictures (Hauswald et al., 2011). These
differences might be related to the different tasks (Think/No-think
or Directed forgetting) or stimuli used (scenes versus words). Fur-
thermore also differences in the Think/No-think procedure might
explain the discrepant results. In this regard, in the present study
direct suppression instructions were given to the participants dur-
ing the think/no-think phase and the results are consistent with
recent work that used this suppression strategy (Bergström et al.,
2009; Hanslmayr et al., 2009, 2010; Benoit and Anderson, 2012;
van Schie et al., 2013). Accordingly, it has been recently shown
that emotionally negative memories can be forgotten by direct
suppression instructions during the Think/no-think phase (van
Schie et al., 2013). Moreover, it has been shown that motivated
expressive suppression in emotion regulation was associated with
less anxiety (Egloff et al., 2006).
We believe that individuals with higher anxiety may lack the
cognitive control mechanisms that allow the modulation of emo-
tional memories. The effect of threat on executive functions has
been recently reported showing that emotional stimuli can inter-
fere with the resources underlying cognitive control (Lindström
and Bohlin, 2012).
Another possibility is that high trait anxious individuals might
be very sensitive to threatening stimuli and as a result, the encod-
ing of emotional information might be so enhanced that normal
cognitive control mechanisms become ineffective in modulating
retrieval (Depue et al., 2006; Marx et al., 2008). This possibil-
ity might be reﬂected by the higher recall accuracy for negative
scenes, that we found, in the baseline condition in the high
compared to low trait anxiety group. In this regard, it is note-
worthy to mention that, in the present study, high compared to
low trait anxious individuals evaluated negative scenes as more
negative and more arousing, conﬁrming an enhanced sensitivity
for negative emotions (Ewbank et al., 2009). It is possible that
high trait anxious individuals are more captured by cues that
trigger negative emotions and are more likely to interpret emo-
tional stimuli as more threat-related than non-anxious individuals
(Bishop,2007). In this regard, it is well known that individualswho
cannot effectively manage normally their emotional responses to
everyday events experience longer and more severe periods of dis-
tress that may evolve into depression or anxiety (Mennin et al.,
2007; Aldao et al., 2010). It is noteworthy to mention that dur-
ing states related to anxiety glucocorticoids are generally elevated
and the arousal produced by this effect might enhance mem-
ory for fearful events (for a review see Erickson et al., 2003). In
this vein, there is evidence that emotion, learning, and memory
might be affected by corticosterone receptors (Roozendaal et al.,
1996).
Furthermore, anxiety might be viewed as the result of difﬁcul-
ties in regulating emotions and in using maladaptive strategies to
cope with stressful life events (Mennin and Fresco, 2009; Aldao
et al., 2010). It has been shown that emotional reactivity was asso-
ciated with maladaptive coping strategies that are strictly linked to
intrusive memories (Regambal and Alden, 2009).
The present ﬁndings might also be related to evidence sug-
gesting that attempts to keep intrusive thoughts out of mind –
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through“thought suppression”– can unintentionally heighten the
recurrence of intrusive thoughts particularly among anxious and
depressed individuals (Wenzlaff and Wegner, 2000; Abramowitz
et al., 2001). This line of research started with the classical study
by Wegner et al. (1987) that found that participants attempting to
suppress thoughts of awhite bear ironically later experiencedmore
white bear thoughts than participants not instructed to suppress.
It might be that this happens especially when an individual with
high trait anxiety attempts to suppress a thought, and speciﬁcally
a negative thought that is more likely to become recurrent than for
a person with low trait anxiety (Magee and Zinbarg, 2007). Thus,
it is possible to link lack of suppression to persistence of intrusive
thoughts especially among individuals with psychopathology or
high trait anxiety (Magee et al., 2012). This is in accord with the
difﬁculty in suppression found for high trait anxious individuals
in the present study.
Our ﬁndings may be viewed as showing that deliberate avoid-
ance of thoughts associated with an emotionally negative experi-
ence may lead to loss of memory (Lambert et al., 2010) but that
this effect is disrupted when the executive control functions are
not so efﬁcient, as is the case in anxiety (Eysenck and Derakshan,
2011). These results, although taken cautiously, might have some
implications for disorders in which ruminative thought and nega-
tivememories are dysfunctional, such as anxiety, depression,OCD,
acute stress disorder (ASD; Aldao et al., 2010; Depue, 2011).
It is important to underline that memory suppression can be
inﬂuenced by individual differences in the capacity for mnemonic
control as shown also in a very recent study in which individu-
als who were able to suppress memory retrieval exhibited tighter
coupling in the prefrontal cortex-cingulate-parietal-hippocampal
network than individuals who did not (Paz-Alonso et al., 2013).
It is likely that differences in the ability to block and control
intrusive memories arise, in part, from differences in executive
control abilities speciﬁcally in engaging inhibitory mechanisms
(Levy and Anderson, 2008). fMRI and EEG studies converge on
the view that retrieval success is voluntarily controlled during
suppression trials (Bäuml and Hanslmayr, 2010) by showing a
down-regulation of memory-related neural activity during no-
think trials (Depue et al., 2007, 2013; Hanslmayr et al., 2009). It has
been shown that voluntary suppression elicits increased activity in
prefrontal areas and decreased activity in brain regions processing
memory representations (Anderson et al., 2004; Depue et al., 2007)
with the hippocampal volume associated to inhibitory processes
of memory retrieval (Depue and Banich, 2012). This suggests
that the PFC inhibits the neural mechanisms underlying memory
processing mediating later forgetting of the suppressed informa-
tion. Moreover, two electrophysiological effects were found that
might reﬂect voluntary memory suppression, namely, an early
anticipatory and a later item-directed process (Hanslmayr et al.,
2009; Depue et al., 2013). Importantly, it has been shown that
enhanced hippocampal activation occurs during the suppression
of emotionally negative stimuli together with the activation of
amygdala, anterior cingulate, and fusiform gyrus (Butler and
James, 2010). Thus, during attempts to suppress negative mem-
ories regions involved in the emotional content of memory are
activated, along with regions reﬂecting conscious recall (Butler
and James, 2010).
In the light of this evidencewe suggest thatmemory control and
suppression are inﬂuenced by individual differences in trait anxi-
ety as a result of a possible impairment in the efﬁciency of executive
functions and speciﬁcally in inhibition processes (Eysenck et al.,
2007; Righi et al., 2009; Eysenck and Derakshan, 2011).
We acknowledge several possible limitations of our study:
ﬁrst, the data cannot provide a detailed characterization of how
recall for think and no-think trials varies as a function of rep-
etition. Moreover, including a clinical sample might have lead
to stronger conclusions and to possible implications for treat-
ment. In relation to this point, it is noteworthy to report that
training depressed participants to suppress negative material, by
providing them with a suppression strategy, increased intentional
forgetting of negative material (Joormann et al., 2009). Apart
from these limitations, our results extend previous ﬁndings (e.g.,
Anderson and Green, 2001; Levy and Anderson, 2002; Depue
et al., 2006) by demonstrating that the think/no-think paradigm
is robust against variations of type of stimulus, number of rep-
etitions, participant’s strategies, and emotional content of the
stimuli.
In closing, the present study raises the possibility that cogni-
tive control for negative valence memories, as reﬂected by the
memory suppression effect, are impaired in high trait anxiety.
Moreover, it highlights the importance of considering individual
differences in memory suppressions studies. Just as each person
has a unique ﬁngerprint or face each of us has a unique emotional
proﬁle and a different way of responding to emotional events or
memories.
This line of research needs to be further pursued, especially by
testing clinical samples, to better uncover the complex interaction
between cognitive control functions, memory encoding, retrieval,
and emotions.
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